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JACQUELINE AGESA AND RICHARD U. AGESA

Market structure–driven discrimination and the earnings of
subordinate managers: an analysis by union density

Abstract: Recent work examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for union and nonunion workers
and finds that standardized union earnings protect black workers from market structure–driven earnings
discrimination. This study examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for low and mid-level
managers in high- and low-union density industries. Our findings indicate that there is less market structure–driven
discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries. We suggest that there is a spillover effect of reduced
market structure–driven discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries that stems from standardized,
more racially equitable wages of union workers.
Key words: discrimination, managers, market structure.

Economists have a revived interest in agency problems and the ability of managers to engage in
discretionary behavior (Williamson, 1963). Particularly, investigating the notion that profit in
noncompetitive industries gives managers the latitude for increased discretionary spending—
resulting in excessive expenditure on workplace amenities
(Edwards, 1977), excessive wages for workers, and racial wage discrimination (Becker, 1971).
The theory implies that noncompetitive market structure provides managers the latitude to
engage in preference-based, market structure–driven earnings discrimination.
The theory premises on the notion that principals—business owners—have incomplete
information, allowing agents—managers—to expend resources to indulge in wage
discrimination. As a result, managers’ ability to engage in market structure–driven earnings
discrimination of workers has been carefully scrutinized in the literature (Agesa and Monaco,
2006; Coleman, 2004; Fujii and Trapani, 1978; Heywood, 1987; Johnson, 1978; Peoples, 1994).
However, the market structure/discrimination literature loosely uses the term managers to refer
to all levels of management as agents of discrimination. In reality, although the duties of lowand mid-level managers include hiring, firing, and determining the wages of workers, they are
also subordinates to chief executives. Thus low- and mid-level black managers can also be
victims of employer-based, market structure–driven discrimination, just as black workers can be
victims.
This study examines the effect of market structure on earnings discrimination of lower- and
mid-level black managers. A thorough examination of market structure–driven discrimination of
this group is warranted. Indeed, Becker (1971) postulates that employers’ tastes for
discrimination might depend considerably on their contact with employees. Because subordinate
managers work in close proximity to employers (presumably, closer proximity relative to
workers), it is conceivable that they may be likely victims of preference-based, market structure–
driven discrimination.

An understanding of market structure–driven discrimination of subordinate managers may also
provide insights regarding scenarios in which they may be protected from it. Recent evidence
finds that standardized union earnings protect black workers from market structure–driven
earnings discrimination (Peoples, 1994). Thus if wage standardization from collective bargaining
shields black workers in less-competitive industries from market structure–driven discrimination,
then this study seeks to answer the question, is there a spillover effect of wage standardization
and, therefore, less market structure–induced discrimination of black managers in highly
unionized industries (relative to managers in less-unionized industries)? Such spillover effects
are conceivable if internal labor markets are operable. Indeed, if internally promoted black
managers experience standardized, less-discriminatory wages as union workers, then salaries free
of market structure–driven discrimination would be necessary to entice them into management.
As a result, we would expect less market structure–driven discrimination of black managers in
highly unionized industries relative to less-unionized industries.
Background
The theory of market structure–driven discrimination
Becker (1971) provides a theory of labor market discrimination that explains discrimination as
a result of managers’ increased latitude for discretionary spending in noncompetitive markets.
Speciﬁcally, intense pressure to reduce costs in ﬁercely competitive industries limits
employers’ latitude to engage in market structure–induced discrimination, whereas the lack of
product market competition in noncompetitive industries provides the latitude for market
structure–driven discrimination to thrive.
Many empirical exercises test this notion using either a single-industry or a multiple-industry
approach. The single-industry approach has been used to examine the effect of deregulation on
racial earnings in the motor carrier, airlines, rail, and telecommunications industries. See
Heywood (1998) for a review of this literature. With the exception of the airline industry,
single-industry studies ﬁnd convincing evidence that enhanced competition reduces racial
earnings discrimination; however, multiple- industry analyses of the relationship have met with
mixed success.
Johnson (1978) provides a multi-industry test of the relationship and ﬁnds that market
concentration insigniﬁcantly inﬂuences the racial earnings gap in communications, utilities,
and transportation industries. In that same year, Fujii and Trapani (1978) ﬁnd no evidence that
market concentration signiﬁcantly inﬂuences earnings discrimination in manufacturing
industries. A shortcoming of both of these studies is that industry categories are designated with
broad, two-digit Standard Indus- trial Classiﬁcation (SIC), which may conceal the variance from
more precisely deﬁned industries that otherwise could yield signiﬁcant results. Heywood (1987)
provides an analysis of the relationship performed after 1980, when new industry deﬁnitions were
created to allow more narrow industry classiﬁcation by three-digit SIC, and ﬁnds strong evidence
to support the relationship.
Peoples (1994) uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine the relationship—
emphasizing differences in the relationship for union and nonunion members—and ﬁnds no

signiﬁcant effect of market structure on the racial wage gap for union workers and a modest
but consistently signiﬁcant effect for nonunion workers. His ﬁndings support the contention that
unions standardize earnings (Freeman, 1980). Particularly, Freeman (ibid.) contends that union
solidarity is difﬁcult to maintain if some workers are paid markedly more than others. Further,
although union and nonunion enterprises employ similar formal wage-setting practices within
each job category, the options for individual wage differentials are generally larger in the nonunion
sector—suggesting that unionization leads to wage standardization. Moreover, Peoples’s (1994)
ﬁndings provide evidence that unions’ standardized earnings protect black workers from market
structure–driven discrimination.
In the current analysis, ﬁndings that managers in high-union density industries experience wage
standardization by race, gender, and education level would suggest that managers experience a
spillover effect of wage homogeneity from union workers—evidence that is consistent with the
notion of less market structure–induced discrimination of managers in highly unionized
industries relative to less-unionized industries.
A recent test of the relationship that allows a different wage structure for union and nonunion
workers (separate wage equations) ﬁnds support for our hypothesis (Agesa and Monaco, 2006).
Yet ﬁndings of recent studies that restrict the impact of market structure on racial wages to be the
same for union and nonunion workers ﬁnd less convincing evidence (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004;
Coleman, 2004); for instance, Agesa and Hamilton’s (2004) test of the relationship utilizes the
Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS), which provide no control for union membership. To
compensate for the lack of union controls, they proxy union status with union density in one
speciﬁcation of their estimation of racial wage disparity. Notwithstanding, this method and each
of their speciﬁcations, restrict the wage-determining process to be the same for workers in highand low-union density industries.
The speciﬁcation used by Coleman (2004) consists of a single equation for union and nonunion
members with a union status control. Moreover, given the different structure of earnings for union
and nonunion workers, the ability of Coleman’s (ibid.) or Agesa and Hamilton’s (2004) singleequation approach to accurately gauge market structure’s differential impact for union and
nonunion workers is problematic. In the current examination of market structure–driven
discrimination of managers, we allow separate wage equations for managers in high- and lowunion density industries. Such a procedure allows a different wage structure for managers in the
two union density groups, thereby allowing a unique impact of market structure on racial wages
for each group.
Managers and market structure–driven discrimination
Analyses of market structure–driven discrimination of workers provide some evidence that
noncompetitive market structure allows ﬁrms more latitude to discriminate relative to ﬁrms in
competitive industries. However, Becker (1971) suggests that employers’ taste for
discrimination might depend considerably on their contact with employees. Thus, the close
proximity of low- and mid-level managers to employers indicates a need to examine market
structure–driven discrimination of this group.

It might be useful to examine a scenario in which market structure–induced discrimination of
workers may extend beyond wage-earning employees to salaried, low- and mid-level
managers. Internal labor markets are labor markets such that workers are hired into entry level
jobs and higher levels are ﬁlled from within. Workers enter or leave a ﬁrm through ports of
entry and exit, with incumbents having priority with regard to internal promotion (Doeringer
and Piore, 1971). Lazear and Oyer (2004) suggest that when internal labor markets are operable,
wages are also determined internally, and may be free of market pressure. Moreover, theories of
discretionary power suggest that the lack of product market competition in noncompetitive
industries gives ﬁrms the latitude to pay above-market wages and the latitude to engage in market
structure–driven discrimination (Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). Thus, rents in noncompetitive
industries may provide a particularly fruitful arena for supra-competitive wages generated in
internal labor markets—at the same time providing the means for market structure–driven
discrimination.
Lazear and Oyer (2004) propose a scenario of internal promotion in which workers are
perfect substitutes for one another and workers rise within organizations based on seniority,
nepotism, inﬂuence, and discrimination. In such a scenario, wages need not move very closely
with market wages. Conceivably, internally promoted managers in less- competitive industries
may be indoctrinated into a system where wages are not market driven and whites
disproportionately beneﬁt from the rents from less-competitive market structure. In such a
scenario, market structure–driven discrimination could transcend up the job ladder to low- and
mid-level black managers.
In external labor markets, workers move somewhat ﬂuidly between ﬁrms and wages are
determined by a market process, where ﬁrms do not have signiﬁcant discretion over wage
setting (ibid.). Such market- determined wage setting is consistent with wage determination in
highly competitive markets, where ﬁerce competition mandates that employers be more efﬁcient
in the distribution of wage payments. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that intense product
market competition serves another purpose—reducing market structure–driven discrimination
(Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). Conceivably, externally hired managers in competitive industries
may be indoctrinated into a system where ﬁerce competition mandates that employers be more
efﬁcient and racially equitable in the distribution of wage payments. In such a scenario, racially
equitable wages may transcend up the job ladder to low- and mid-level black managers in
competitive industries.
Although, low- and mid-level managers are not usually covered by collective bargaining
agreements, it is conceivable that wage standardization in highly unionized, less-competitive
industries protects black managers from market structure–driven earnings discrimination. We
utilize the hypothetical case of black union workers who are internally promoted to
management. In union shops, workers are indoctrinated into a system where standardized, racially
equitable wages are the norm. Conceivably, wages free of market structure–driven discrimination
would be necessary to attract internally promoted black union workers to management, and the
practice of paying less discriminatory wages would transcend up the job ladder to low- and midlevel black managers.
Although there are many theories to explain internal labor markets, empirical exercises have
produced few indisputable conclusions (Baker and Holmstrom, 1995). Most internal labor market

studies utilize personnel data to investigate the allocation of workers and their wages. See Lin
(2005) for a comprehensive review of this literature. The current study does not examine the
correlation between the occurrence of internal labor markets and market structure–driven
discrimination. We simply point out that less-competitive market structure provides an ideal
scenario for each of these inefﬁcient labor market processes to ﬂourish. This study examines the
effect of market structure on earnings discrimination of lower- and mid-level black managers.
Further, given recent evidence that standardized earnings of collective bargaining protect black
workers from market structure–driven discrimination, we seek to determine if there is less
market structure–driven discrimination for managers in highly unionized industries relative to
less-unionized industries. We suggest that the lack of market structure–driven discrimination in
highly unionized industries stems from the standardized and more racially equitable wagedetermining process of unionized workers.
Data
To test the above hypothesis, we use data taken from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs)
1995–2000 of white and black male managers, age 16 and over, employed in manufacturing
industries (National Bureau of Economic Research [NBER], 2005). 1 As managers are observed
twice in CPS ORGs ﬁles, we omit their second observation. Because our analysis is of wages of
low- and mid-level managers, 588 managers with top-coded wages are also removed from the
data set.
We match individual manager’s three-digit Census Industry Code (CIC) with industrylevel data on four-ﬁrm market concentration, the capital–labor ratio, and plant size taken from
the 1997 Census of Manufacturers (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). We convert industry characteristics
from ﬁve-digit North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) to three-digit CIC by
weighing industry value of shipments. The capital-to-labor ratio (K/L) is calculated as
expenditure on capital divided by industry employment. Plant size (plant size) is industry
employment divided by number of establishments. Four-ﬁrm industry concentration ratios serve
as our measure of product market competition; however, with some limitations. First, because the
Census consolidates only four-ﬁrm concentration ratios for manufacturing industries into a readily
accessible format, we limit our analysis to managers in manufacturing industries. However,
because the manufacturing sector constitutes a small portion of the U.S. workforce (currently
about 15 percent), this analysis does not provide a complete picture of the effects of market
concentration on racial earnings for all workers in the labor market. Also, because industry
concentration is a national statistic, it does not capture local or regional competitiveness (Agesa
and Hamilton, 2004). Notwithstanding these limitations, four-ﬁrm concentration is the typical
measure of firm concentration used in analyses of industry market concentration and labor
market outcomes.
1 Ideally, we would have liked to use the annual March CPS files (NBER, 2005) for this analysis because they provide data on
managers’ annual salaries, a more accurate earnings measure for this group. However, because of the limited sample size of the
March files, there were too few observations in each race, union density, and market structure cell to permit the measurement of
differences in racial earnings for each subgroup.

Table 1 presents a breakdown of the wages of managers in our sample and their real hourly
earnings (in 2000 dollars) by manager type and race. In many manager categories, blacks are
paid less than their white counterparts. The exceptions are financial managers, personnel training
managers, and purchasing agents. However, the number of black managers in each of these
categories is small enough such that outliers may extremely bias average earnings.
Table 1
Wages of low- and mid-level managers in manufacturing industries: CPS ORGs, 1995–2000
Average real hourly wage*
Type of manager
Financial managers

Blacks
30.72

Whites
29.77

(6)
(390)
16.09
27.24
(12)
(248)
Purchasing managers
11.97
25.85
(4)
(210)
Advertising and public relations managers
22.73
32.48
(33)
(1,066)
Managers and administrators
23.70
31.76
(196)
(7,015)
Management analysts
26.15
41.62
(12)
(258)
Personnel training manager
23.38
21.78
(32)
(348)
Purchasing agents
21.17
18.40
(24)
(700)
Management-related occupations
19.65
25.47
(9)
(319)
Total number
328
10,554
Notes: *Real hourly wages are in 2000 dollars. Occupations are by three-digit occupation code. The number of individuals in the
category of managers is indicated by the number in parentheses. Top-coded earners are eliminated.
Personnel and labor relations managers

Table 2 presents a summary of black representation and average hourly earnings of managers
by market structure, union density, and wage levels. Blacks are underrepresented in management
but especially in higher wage management positions. Particularly, black representation is 3
percent and 2.4 percent in high- and low-density industries, respectively, and the average wage
of blacks is $23.12 and $22.08, respectively. Yet blacks represent roughly 5 percent in each
union density group in the lowest earnings quartile and only 0.5 percent in the highest quartile.
Moreover, the findings of fairly equal black representation in high- and low-density industries
suggest little spillover effects of worker unionization in reducing market structure–initiated
employment discrimination of managers. 2
Methodology
A switching regression technique is used to bifurcate managers into high-concentration, less-

2Table 2 also indicates that black representation is highest in high-wage, less competitive industries (average wage $24.81, 3.8

percent black) relative to low-wage, less-competitive industries (average wage $22.74, 2.5 percent black)—indicating that
without controls for union density, there is no evidence of market structure–driven employment discrimination.

Table 2
Percent black and average hourly wage of managers in manufacturing, 1995–2000
Less competitive

All managers

Percent

Average

Percent

Average

black
3.78

hourly wage
24.81

black
2.54

hourly wage
22.74

High-union density

All managers

Competitive

Low-union density

Percent
black

Average
hourly wage

Percent
black

Average
hourly wage

3.01

23.12

2.45

22.08

0–25th quintile
5.01
18.07
4.39
17.94
25th–50th quintile
2.61
21.57
1.63
21.64
50th–75th quintile
2.79
25.55
2.00
25.40
75th–100th quintile
0.47
29.83
0.45
29.51
Source: CPS ORG 1995–2000 (NBER 2005) with top-coded earners eliminated.

competitive industries and low-concentration, competitive industries. The critical concentration
is 50 percent. 3 As a result, industries with four-ﬁrm concentration ratios equal to or exceeding 50
percent are classiﬁed as “less-competitive,” whereas those lower than this threshold are
designated as “competitive.”
To estimate the relationship between market structure and racial wages for managers in the period
1996 to 2000, we utilize ordinary least squares (OLS). Speciﬁcally,
ln(wagei) = a + bX + cY + dZ + f(black) + g(less-competitive)
+ h(black*less-competitive) + ui, (1)

where ln(wagei) is the log of hourly wages of managers in 2000 dollars, X is a matrix of
managers’ attributes, Y is a matrix of industry characteristics, and Z is a matrix of year and
quarter time controls. Manager attributes include dummies for marital status (married and
separated, divorced, or widowed, with single managers as the omitted group), region
(northeast, north central, south, with west as the omitted group), an urban dummy (cmsa),
education dummies (high school diploma, some college, college degree, graduate degree, with
managers with less than a high school diploma as the omitted group), and veteran status as well
as age and its square. Dummy variables for the type of manager are included (administrators and
ﬁnance managers, managers and administrators, advertising and public relation managers,
purchasing agents and personnel training managers, with other managers as the omitted group).
The broad categories of managers reveal a shortcoming of using the CPS ORG for this analysis.
The CPS utilizes three-digit occupational coding—sometimes producing large, heterogeneous
3A critical concentration of 50 percent is substantially lower than the critical concentration of 65 percent found in previous

studies that utilize the Census of Manufacturers for 1982, 1987, and 1992 (Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). The lower critical
concentration found in the switching procedure used in this analysis is the result of fewer high-concentration manufacturing
industries in the United States.

categories under a single occupational code. In our analysis, “managers and administrators” are a
particularly large category of low- and mid-level managers in manufacturing industries. Indeed,
the category “managers and administrators” consists of 7,211 observations and roughly 66
percent of all managers in our sample (see Table 1). Further, recent evidence suggests that this
group of managers has particularly heterogeneous wages (Helwege, 1992). Thus, the use of
broad dummy variable occupational categories to control for manager types in wage regressions
could distort our ﬁndings of the market structure/discrimination relationship.
Industry-level variables in our regression (matrix Y) include plant size and the capital–labor
ratio. The matrix of time controls includes a dummy variable for each year and quarter
combination from 1995 to 2000 to account for yearly and quarterly changes in macroeconomic
conditions (with the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 as the omitted group).
The variables of particular interest to this study are the dummy variables for black racial status
(black), less-competitive market structure (less-competitive), and the interaction of the two
(black*less-competitive). The coefﬁcient on the variable black, f, captures the black/white wage
differential for managers in competitive industries. If this coefﬁcient is negative, it provides
evidence of earnings discrimination of managers in competitive industries. The coefﬁcient on
less-competitive, g, captures the change in earnings for white managers as a result of employment
in less-competitive industries. If white managers are the beneﬁciaries of a portion of the rents in
less-competitive industries, then we would expect this coefﬁcient to be positive.
The interaction term, black*less-competitive, captures the differential effect of market
structure on the racial wage differential of managers. If less-competitive market structure allows
more latitude for wage discrimination against subordinate managers, then we would expect the
coefﬁcient to be negative. Moreover, the sum of coefﬁcients f and g provides the
measurement of the black/white wage differential for subordinate managers in less-competitive
industries. It is important to note that our earnings speciﬁcation assumes that there is no racial
sorting into unionized industries. Thus, our measure of labor market discrimination is limited to
gauging wage discrimination.
We next separate managers in manufacturing into two groups by the union density of the
workers in the managers’ three-digit CIC industry.4 Speciﬁcally, managers in industries with
union density at or above the median union density for each year are designated in high-union
density industries, with managers in industries with density below the median are designated in lowdensity industries. 5 We then estimate Equation (1) separately for managers in high- and low-union
density industries—allowing a different impact of market structure on racial earnings for
managers in the two union density groups.
Wage equations estimated by OLS reveal how market structure affects the black/white wage
gap of the average manager, providing no information regarding market structure’s effect on
the wage gap along the distribution of earnings. We utilize quantile regressions, as they provide
4 Data on union density by three-digit CIC are taken from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).
5 The median industry union densities are 17.6, 16.9, 15.7, 16.2, 16.3, and 15.5 for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000,
respectively.

a less restrictive estimation procedure that allows the measurement of marginal effects of
covariates on the earnings of managers at different points along the distribution of managers’
earnings (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The quantile regression procedure estimates the θth quantile
of the log of hourly earnings of managers (y) conditional on covariates (ibid.). We perform
quantile regressions separately for managers in high- and low-union density industries. We use
these results to test whether market structure’s effect on the earnings gap differs for managers at
different earnings levels in high- and low-union density industries. Standard errors that are robust
against arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity of the error distribution are obtained by
bootstrapping (Buchinsky, 1994).
Results
The racial wage gap of managers in competitive and less-competitive industries
Table 3 presents the racial wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and the
difference in the racial wage gap under the two market structures for the subgroups of all
managers and managers in high- and low-union density industries, respectively. The racial wage
gap in competitive industries is derived from the coefﬁcient on black in Equation (1), where
signiﬁcance is determined by a t-test of the coefﬁcient for each subgroup. The interaction term
measures the differential wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and is
indicated by the added differential column in Table 3 for each subgroup. Moreover, the added
differential directly tests Becker’s (1971) theory for each group of managers, as it captures the
added racial wage gap in less-competitive industries relative to the gap in competitive industries.
Speciﬁcally, if less-competitive market structure promotes increased racial wage gaps, then
Becker’s assertion is true for that subgroup. The racial wage gap in less-competitive industries is
derived from the sum of the coefﬁcients on black and black*less-competitive in Equation (1)
and signiﬁcance is determined by an F-test of joint signiﬁcance for each subgroup. The
complete OLS results for each subgroup are available from the authors on request.
The top portion of Table 3 indicates that black managers in competitive industries earn 16.6,
14.2, and 17.7 percentage points less than their white counterparts overall and in high- and lowunion density industries, respectively.6 These ﬁndings reveal a smaller racial wage gap in
competitive industries in highly unionized industries relative to low-union density industries—
ﬁndings consistent with wage standardization by race in highly unionized industries. The added
wage differential in less- competitive industries is insigniﬁcant for all managers and those in highand low-union density industries, respectively, indicating that the racial wage gap is
insigniﬁcantly larger in less-competitive industries relative to competitive industries for all
managers and managers in high- and low-union density industries.
Adding the racial wage gap in competitive industries (the coefﬁcient on black) and the added
differential for each subgroup (the coefﬁcient on the interaction) yields the black/white wage
gap for managers in less-competitive industries for that subgroup. We utilize an F-test of the
6 The marginal impact of a characteristic on the wage of the group in question is found by taking the exponential of the estimated
coefficient minus one and multiplying by 100.

Competitive

0.1655***

Added
differential

Competitive

Added
differential

Less
competitive

Low-union density

0.1665

Less
competitive

High-union density

0.0010

Added
differential

Less
competitive

All
0.1420***
0.0246
0.1666
0.1767***
0.1951
0.3718**
25th quantile
0.0761*
0.1960**
0.2721**
0.2233***
0.3701***
0.5934***
50th quantile
0.1187***
0.0138
0.1325
0.1602***
0.0640
0.2242*
75th quantile
0.1488***
0.0163
0.1651
0.1538***
0.1771**
0.3309**
90th quantile
0.1563**
0.1127
0.2690
0.1778***
0.2697**
0.4475**
Notes: The racial wage gap in competitive industries is derived from the coefﬁcient on black in Equation (1), where signiﬁcance is determined by a t-test of
the coefﬁcient. The racial wage gap in less-competitive industries is derived from the sum of the coefﬁcients on black and black*less-competitive in Equation (1) and signiﬁcance is determined by an F-test of joint signiﬁcance. For both F- and t-tests ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.

All managers

Competitive

Table 3
A summary of the black/white wage gap for managers in manufacturing industries, 1995–2000

joint signiﬁcance of these variables and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant racial wage gap of 37.2 percentage
points for managers in low-union density, less-competitive industries. Because the added wage
gap in less-competitive industries relative to competitive industries is insigniﬁcant in each
speciﬁcation, our OLS results ﬁnd no support for Becker’s hypothesis. However, an
examination of the differences in the magnitude of the wage gap in less-competitive industries
in high- and low-union density industries (0.1666 and 0.3718, respectively) foreshadows
differences in market structure–driven discrimination of black managers that will be exposed
utilizing quantile regression.
Quantile estimates in high-union density industries
The lower portion of Table 3 provides a summary of quantile regression estimates of the racial
wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and the added racial wage differential
between the two market structures. Results for managers in high-union density industries are
presented on the left. The black/white wage gap in high-union density, competitive industries is
7.6, 11.9, 14.9, and 15.6 percentage points at the twenty-ﬁfth, ﬁftieth, seventy-ﬁfth, and ninetieth
quantiles, respectively. The added differential in less-competitive industries is signiﬁcant for
managers in the twenty-ﬁfth quantile—indicating that less-competitive market structure
increases the racial wage gap of low-salary managers in highly unionized industries by 19.6
percentage points relative to the gap in competitive, highly unionized industries. An F-test for
the joint signiﬁcance of black and black*less-competitive reveals a signiﬁcant racial wage gap
of 27.2 percentage points of managers in highly unionized, less-competitive industries at the
twenty-ﬁfth quantile. However, the added differentials are small and insigniﬁcant for managers
in the median through ninetieth quantile—suggesting there is no substantial difference in the
racial wage gaps for medium and high salary managers in competitive and less-competitive
industries. These ﬁndings provide little support for Becker’s hypothesis for managers in highly
unionized industries.
Quantile estimates in low-union density industries
The lower right portion of Table 3 provides a summary of quantile regression estimates of the
racial wage gap in low-union density industries in competitive and less-competitive industries.
The racial wage gap in competitive, low-union density industries is 22.3, 16.0, 15.4, and 17.8
percentage points for managers at the twenty-ﬁfth, ﬁftieth, seventy-ﬁfth, and ninetieth quantiles,
respectively. It is interesting to note that at each level of the earnings distribution, the racial
wage gap in competitive industries is consistently higher in low-union density industries relative
to high-union density industries (comparing columns 2 and 5 of Table 3).
The consistently smaller racial wage gap for managers in competitive, highly unionized
industries relative to the gap for their counterparts in competitive, low-union density industries
provides support for the notion that standardized union wages that reduce earnings disparity of
union workers (Freeman, 1980) have an additional effect of reducing earnings disparity of
managers in highly unionized industries.

The added racial wage differential in less-competitive industries tests Becker’s hypothesis at
each quantile for managers in low-union density industries (column 6). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
difference in the racial wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries of 37.0, 17.7,
and 27.0 percentage points for managers at the twenty-ﬁfth, seventy-ﬁfth, and ninetieth
quantiles. These ﬁndings provide support for the notion that in low-union density industries,
less-competitive market structure provides increased latitude for racial earnings discrimination
against black managers. 7 Moreover, quantile estimates of the black/white wage gap for
managers in low-union density, less-competitive industries are presented in column 7. We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant racial wage gap of 59.3, 22.4, 33.1, and 44.7 percentage points for managers at the
twenty-ﬁfth, ﬁftieth, seventy-ﬁfth, and ninetieth quantiles, respectively.
It is worthy of mention that market structure–driven discrimination of managers in lowunion density industries displays no distinguish- able pattern by earnings level. For instance,
the differential impact of market structure on the racial earnings gap is smallest at the median
quantile, then it increases for higher wage managers; yet, the impact is largest for workers at the
twenty-ﬁfth quantile. The erratic pattern of market structure–driven discrimination by wage
levels for low-union density industry managers is in contrast to recent work that reveals a
systemic pattern for nonunion workers (Agesa and Monaco, 2006). 8
The contrasting ﬁnding by wage level for workers and managers may stem from this study’s
inability to distinguish managers by the actual unionization of workers in their shop utilizing
CPS data. Thus, we employ a feasible second-best alternative—separating managers into two
groups by the union density of workers in the managers’ three-digit CIC industry
classiﬁcation. Moreover, our approach lacks precision in connecting managers to the union
status of their workers and, therefore, may not completely capture the pattern of market structure
discrimination by wage level.
Notwithstanding, our analysis provides convincing evidence of less market structure–induced
discrimination of black managers in highly unionized industries relative to managers in lessunionized industries. We suggest that internal labor markets in low-union density, less-competitive
industries may promote preference-based, market structure–driven earnings discrimination,
whereas market-dictated efﬁciency in competitive industries is consistent with external
promotion.
The returns to education of managers in high- and low-union density industries
The returns to education, as indicated by the coefﬁcients on the education categories in
7 In separate analyses not shown (but available on request), OLS and quantile wage regressions were run for black and white
female managers in high- and low-union density manufacturing industries. The goal was to test for market structure–driven racial
earnings discrimination for female managers at different wage levels. Thus, the exact specifications that are outlined in our
methodology section were run for female, black, and white managers. We find little evidence of market structure racial earnings
discrimination for females. Further, dividing the data into high- and low-union density industries and using quantile regression to
examine racial wages by earnings level produced little evidence of reduced market structure–driven racial earnings
discrimination of females in highly unionized industries.
8 Specifically, Agesa and Monaco (2006) find substantial evidence of market structure–driven discrimination of nonunion
workers and that high-wage black nonunion workers experience less market structure–driven discrimination relative to their lowwage counterparts.

Some
college

Associate
degree

College
degree
Graduate

Managers
All
0.2296***
0.3364***
0.3700***
0.6718***
0.8176***
High-union density
0.1821***
0.3045***
0.3235***
0.6279***
0.7350***
Low-union density
0.2724***
0.3708***
0.4145***
0.7143***
0.8795***
High-union density by quantile
25th
0.2108**
0.2995***
0.3554***
0.7039***
0.9523***
50th
0.1020
0.2137***
0.2761***
0.5743***
0.6869***
75th
0.1909**
0.3148***
0.2964***
0.6901***
0.7905***
90th
0.1327
0.2198*
0.2057
0.5439***
0.6339***
Low-union density by quantile
25th
0.2639***
0.3593***
0.3971***
0.7386***
01.0029***
50th
0.3019***
0.3545***
0.4114***
0.6691***
0.9925***
75th
0.3098***
0.4144***
0.4404***
0.8139***
0.9784***
90th
0.5708***
0.6552***
0.7165***
1.0993***
1.2065***
Notes: The return to each level of education for a group is derived from the coefﬁcient on the education category variable in Equation (1), where signiﬁcance
is determined by a t-test of the coefﬁcient. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

High school
diploma

Education levels

Table 4
A summary of the returns to education for managers in manufacturing industries, 1995–2000

Equation (1), are presented to test if wages are more standardized by education level for
managers in highly unionized industries relative to less-unionized industries. Table 4 provides
a summary of the returns to education as indicated by the coefﬁcients on the education
categories in Equation (1). The top portion of Table 4 provides a summary of the returns to
education categories and their signiﬁcance for all managers (ﬁrst row) and managers in highand low-union density industries (second and third row, respectively). It is interesting to
note that the coefﬁcients on the education dummies are consistently higher for managers in
low-union density industries relative to managers in high-union density industries. For instance,
the returns to a high school diploma are 18.2 and 27.2 percentage points more relative to
managers with less than a high school diploma for managers in high- and low-union density
industries, respectively. These ﬁndings are consistent with the assertion of wage
standardization in highly unionized industries.
If we compare the quantile estimates of the returns to education for managers in high- and
low-union density industries (Table 4, rows 4–6 and 7–10, respectively), the returns to education
is consistently higher for managers in low-union density industries relative to managers in
high-union density industries at each quantile. These ﬁndings are consistent with our ﬁndings
in the OLS model and provide additional support for the contention of wage standardization in
highly unionized industries. 9
We test the robustness of our results. Speciﬁcally, a previously mentioned shortcoming of our
regression speciﬁcation is the inclusion of broad occupational dummies for each category of
managers. Particularly, the category “managers and administrators” constituted a very large and
heterogeneous group of subordinate managers. The heterogeneity of this group may have distorted
our ﬁndings in either direction—suggesting that there is a relationship between market structure
and discrimination for managers when, in essence, there is not, or diluting the estimated
relationship. To test this, we reestimate quantile regressions (at the twenty-ﬁfth, ﬁftieth,
seventy-ﬁfth, and ninetieth quantiles) separately by union density (high- and low-union
density) and manager category (managers and administrators and all other managers). Our
ﬁndings for each of the two groups reveal a similar pattern as our quantile estimates of the
entire sample—small and insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for the black*less-competitive interaction
term for managers at most quantiles in high-union density industries, and large estimates on that
coefﬁcient in low-union density industries—albeit, the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients dramatically
declines as a result of the drastic reduction in sample size. Moreover, these ﬁndings, taken in
conjunction with previous analyses of market structure–driven discrimination of union and
nonunion workers (Peoples, 1994), provide support for the notion that standardized union work
rules and wages offer black workers and managers a sanctuary from market structure–driven
discrimination.
9 In separate analyses not shown (but available on request), OLS and quantile wage regressions, separate for managers in highand low-union density industries, were run which included both male and female managers. The specifications included a gender
dummy, as well as the controls in Equation (1). A comparison of the coefficients on the gender dummy for managers in high- and
low-union density industries allows the test of wage standardization by gender in highly unionized industries. We find evidence
of smaller gender earnings gaps in highly unionized industries—indicating wage standardization by gender in highly unionized
industries.

Conclusion
The literature on market structure and earnings discrimination of union and nonunion workers
provides evidence that unionization protects black workers from market structure–driven earnings
discrimination (ibid.). This study extends prior research on the role of unionization in altering the
market structure/racial earnings relationship by examining the relationship for low- and mid-level
managers. Given that managers routinely are not covered by collective bargaining agreements, a
formidable way to examine unionization’s role in altering the relationship for this group is to
estimate the relationship separating managers into those in high- and low-union density
industries. Moreover, this study seeks to determine if wage standardization in highly unionized
industries protects black managers from market structure–driven discrimination similarly to the
way that unionization protects black workers. Further, this study utilizes quantile regression,
which provides a complete analysis of the market structure/racial earnings relationship for
managers along the spectrum of earnings levels.
We ﬁnd little evidence of market structure–driven discrimination for black managers at various
earnings levels in highly unionized industries. In fact, only managers at the twenty-ﬁfth quantile
have a larger earnings gap in less-competitive industries relative to the gap at this quantile in
competitive industries. Regressions of earnings of managers in low-union density industries that
utilize measures of central tendency ﬁnd no evidence of market structure–driven discrimination
for this group—for in- stance, regressions around the median quantile and OLS evaluated for the
average manager in low-union density industries each ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of lesscompetitive market structure on earnings discrimination. However, quantile regressions evaluated
at most other quantiles ﬁnd evidence of market structure–induced discrimination of black
managers in less-unionized industries. These ﬁndings provide evidence of market structure–
driven discrimination for black managers in low-union density industries, and weak evidence
(only at the twenty-ﬁfth quantile) for their counterparts in highly unionized industries. We also
ﬁnd evidence of wage standardization by race, gender, and education in highly unionized
industries—ﬁndings consistent with the contention of less market structure–driven
discrimination in highly unionized industries.
Caution is warranted in the interpretation of our results. Speciﬁcally, our analysis is limited to
manufacturing industries and, therefore, our ﬁndings are not necessarily indicative of patterns of
market structure–driven earnings discrimination for the entire labor market. Further, we do not
account for racial sorting into union employment. Notwithstanding, this study provides evidence
that the environment of increased racial earnings equality that is created by standardized wages and
work rules of unionization transcends workers directly protected by collective bargaining
agreements—in this case, reducing market structure–driven discrimination of black managers at
most earnings levels in highly unionized industries.
There are policy implications of our results. Our ﬁndings indicate that workers’ unionization
protects black managers from market structure– induced discrimination; however, unionization
has declined dramatically in the past three decades (Farber and Western, 2001). Thus, our
results, taken in conjunction with previous ﬁndings that unionization also protects black
workers from market structure–driven discrimination (Peoples, 1994), indicate that black
managers and workers are quickly losing a refuge from market structure–driven

discrimination. Accordingly, increased antidiscriminatory policies may be necessary to combat
black workers’ and managers’ potentially increased exposure to preference-based, market
structure–driven discrimination as a result of declining unionization.
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